The primary purpose of this special issue of the Review of Network Economics is to address issues related to the dynamics of firm behavior and efficiency in network industries. A secondary purpose, where relevant, is to analyze the relationship between the nature of the regulatory regime and the performance over time of the firms subject to that regime. Topics include: the evolution of price-cost margins, the incentives to undertake investment, innovation and the implications for productivity growth, the dynamics of firm interaction and strategic behavior, and the development and effectiveness of regulatory regimes.
upstream could foster entry and thereby encourage an incumbent firm to undertake investment and innovation in order to sustain its performance in the downstream market.
Hence, as a matter of public policy transitory distortions in static efficiency are regularly accepted in order to encourage dynamic efficiency. These trade-offs are likely to be particularly important in technologically advanced industries such as telecommunications that serve as key drivers of economic growth, but also require significant investment in sunk costs that are sensitive to the uncertainty of cost recovery.
A second reason highlighting the significance of dynamics and efficiency arises from the tendency to presume that the social costs associated with foregone innovation and delayed productivity improvements are insignificant because they are not readily measured or observed by policymakers. However, there may be high social costs associated with new services and production processes, which are not developed but would have been otherwise.
1 Therefore, to focus solely on price as an indicator of competitive efficiency, while ignoring investment and technological advances, is to overlook the important dynamic features of the competitive process -in the spirit of Schumpeter.
Lastly, a critical feature of network industries involves relatively large capital expenditure outlays 2 associated with irreversible investment (investment is to be viewed in a broad sense to include capital formation, cost-reducing activities, and new service and product development). 3 In network industries, investment is irreversible for some types of capital because its physical characteristics prevent expenditure recovery through resale. For example, in the natural gas industry, the majority of the cost of underground cast iron mains is the cost of burying the mains, and so removing them for resale would be prohibitively expensive. For other cases such as investments in new product or service development, and equipment investment (such as telecommunications switches) that presumably could be uninstalled, the problem is the industry-specificity of the capital stock (in other words investment is not fungible). Because of limited alternative uses, capital's resale value is tied to the industry's business cycle. Thus, when conditions turn unfavorable and a firm attempts to disinvest, there are no buyers as all firms are on the selling side of the market. Selling is not financially viable, and under such circumstances investment becomes de facto irreversible. For all of the above reasons, a special issue devoted to dynamic efficiency in network industries is opportune.
The first paper in the issue by Robert Pindyck entitled "Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks" serves to illustrate the close relationship between the nature of a regulatory regime and the investment behavior of the firms subject to that regime. Pindyck analyses the investment incentives in the face of network-sharing mandates arising from the passage of the 1996 U.S. Telecommunication Act. These network-sharing mandates required incumbents to unbundle their networks and lease the 1 For example, Jerry A. Hausman (1997) argues that regulatory indecision delayed the introduction of cellular telephones in the United States for seven to ten years, and that the cost to consumers was in the range of $31-$50 billion each year (in 1994 dollars). But also see Pakes (1997) for a critique. 2 For example, Marianne Fay and Tito Yepes (2003) estimate that $370 billion of new infrastructure investment is required annually to 2010, plus an additional annual investment of $480 billion for maintenance. 3 Also infrastructure investment will necessarily yield uncertain returns over its useful life because typically future market conditions, by their very nature, are uncertain. Notice that if either network investments were largely reversible or if there were very little uncertainty over the future market conditions, then the issue of risk could be ignored. With reversible investment a firm could disinvest if market conditions became unfavorable.
individual network components, what are commonly referred to as unbundled network elements or UNEs, to rivals under terms and conditions set by regulators. This was a controversial industrial policy from the outset as the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in twice regarding the Act's implementation and the decisions rendered by the lower courts are seemingly too numerous to count.
The ability to lease infrastructure facilities is potentially valuable when facility investments are mainly irreversible. Leasing enables a firm to avoid the losses from past irreversible investment, if and when future unfavorable business conditions occur. Therefore, in a regulatory context, the pricing formula used by regulators to set (wholesale) prices for access to network infrastructure must compensate firms for their long-term investment commitment and the ensuing benefit to rivals who choose to lease rather build their own facilities. Wholesale network prices set "too low" inappropriately subsidize leasing, and discourage infrastructure investment, while prices set "too high" generate excessive rents to infrastructure ownership, and limit competition by efficient rivals (both existing and potential).
The calculation of the regulated prices for the UNEs in the U.S. is guided by a framework called Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs, or TELRIC. Under this regime, prices are based on the cost structure of an efficient, cost-minimizing firm with an optimally configured network built with the current technology, subject to the constraint that the locations of key parts of the network are determined by the regulated firm's existing network. 4 This approach aims to create a rental rate for each network element that would equal the incremental cost of creating and supplying that leased element if the network owner were designing and constructing a completely new, optimally configured network with current state-of-the-art technology.
Pindyck finds that TELRIC pricing is inefficient in the sense that it under-compensates for investments in infrastructure, thus discourages further investment. One reason focuses on declining equipment costs. TELRIC prices do not allow regulated firms to fully recover their sunk costs because the TELRIC price is based on the current cost of network equipment, rather than the cost actually incurred by the firm. Telecom equipment costs tend to fall over time as a result of technological improvements and increasing competition among suppliers, so the firm will receive a price based on the current marginal cost, which is less than the marginal cost it actually incurred when undertaking the irreversible investment.
Pindyck's second reason that TELRIC pricing under-compensates for infrastructure investment has to do with its treatment of risk. Since future market conditions are uncertain, any investment in network infrastructure will yield uncertain returns. When considering a new investment, the network owner views the opportunity for positive returns in "good times" as compensation for potential losses in "bad times". However, a firm considering renting network facilities will only do so if market conditions are favorable. Thus, unlike the firm that actually undertakes the irreversible investment, the renter does not bear the burden of the uncertainty -it benefits on the upside, while avoiding the downside. Thus under both conditions, namely irreversible investment and uncertain investment returns, there is an option value to waiting rather than investing.
When a firm makes an irreversible investment, it gives up its option to wait to see how uncertainty is resolved. Pindyck argues that the TELRIC price does not take this option value into account. He concludes that the network owner subsidizes the renter by bearing the entire cost of downside exposure to risk, which in turn discourages investment.
The second paper by Jeffrey Bernstein and Theofanis Mamuneas entitled, "Irreversible Investment, Capital Costs and Productivity Growth: Implications for Telecommunications" continues the theme of irreversibility and telecommunications. Bernstein and Mamuneas undertake an econometric investigation to evaluate whether telecommunications investment is irreversible, and the resulting implications for the opportunity cost of capital, for the hurdle rate of return, and the subsequent consequences related to productivity performance. Bernstein-Mamuneas recognize that irreversible investment implies that a firm must incur substantial costs as it attempts to disinvest, and accordingly capital cannot be shed like many other inputs. As network investments generally have limited alternative uses outside of a particular industry, a firm commits to production in that industry. This commitment is costly, and so as a consequence of the inability to disinvest, the hurdle rate of return on capital must exceed the opportunity cost when disinvestment is viable. Bernstein-Mamuneas develop a model of production and investment that incorporates costly disinvestment, which is then applied to telecommunications in order to estimate the magnitude of the commitment premium. Estimates of a non-zero premium provide evidence of the costs associated with irreversible investment. The authors find that telecommunications investment is indeed irreversible, and the irreversibility premium raises the opportunity cost of capital by 70 percent. The higher opportunity cost implies an annual hurdle rate averaging 14 percent over the period from 1986 to 2002.
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is an important indicator of dynamic performance as it measures the efficiency over time by which inputs are transformed into outputs. TFP growth is defined as the difference between a weighted average of output quantity growth rates (with revenue shares as weights), and a weighted average of input quantity growth rates (with cost shares as weights). With irreversible investment, Bernstein-Mamuneas find that cost shares must include the commitment premium required to compensate firms for undertaking irreversible investment. Productivity growth estimates for telecommunications generally exclude the costs of disinvestment. Therefore "observed" TFP growth actually mismeasures the "correct or adjusted" rate, defined to include the appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of capital. An increase in the opportunity cost of capital due to the fact that investment is irreversible raises the capital cost share weight relative to the other input cost shares, and if capital is growing relatively faster (respectively slower) than the other factors of production then observed input growth will understate (respectively overstate) the corrected rate of input growth. As a consequence observed, productivity growth will overstate (respectively understate) the appropriately adjusted rate of TFP growth. Bernstein-Mamuneas estimate that observed growth, which as noted omits the commitment premium, averaged 2.8 percent annually from 1986 to 2002. This rate annually exceeded adjusted TFP growth by 0.7 percentage points; therefore observed growth overestimated the corrected productivity growth by 33 percent.
The next two papers in the issue are theoretical, and are motivated by regulatory developments in telecommunications. The paper by Philip Gayle and Dennis Weisman entitled, "Efficiency Trade-Offs in the Design of Competition Policy for the Telecommunications Industry" concerns the protracted debate over the implementation of the 1996 U.S. Telecommunications Act and corresponding trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiency. Specifically, setting low prices for UNEs may enhance competition and yield lower prices in the short-run, but perhaps only at the cost of reduced investment in innovation in the longer run. It is significant that policy analysis regarding innovation in the telecommunications industry has not distinguished between process and product innovation. Nor have these policies disentangled the effects of mandatory unbundling from the effects associated with the pricing of UNEs.
At its core, the government's decision regarding the specific network elements to unbundle, at what prices, and for how long is not materially different from intellectual property decisions regarding copyrights, patents and trademarks (CPT), which are essentially government-created barriers to entry. CPTs are granted in order to provide the innovator with the requisite incentives to innovate. At any given point in time, the government could presumably declare all CPT null and void. In the short-run, this would serve to reduce the prices for products and services that previously operated under CPT protections. In the longer run, such actions would serve to reduce the rate of innovation.
With respect to process innovation, in particular, Gayle and Weisman find that investment in innovation increases when network unbundling obligations are relaxed. This result may not be all that surprising given that incentives to innovate are dampened when a firm is precluded from capturing the full returns from its innovations. What is perhaps more surprising is that investment in process innovation is shown to be a decreasing rather than an increasing function of UNE prices when such prices preserve the entrant's efficient make-or-buy decision.
5 The efficient make-or-buy decision entails the entrant making (buying) the input when it is (not) the least-cost provider. In other words, even when UNEs are priced so as to induce the entrant to make the efficient make-or-buy decision from a static perspective, mandatory unbundling lowers the incumbent's incentive to invest from a dynamic perspective.
Notably, while considerable research has focused on the disincentives for investment in innovation associated with artificially low UNE prices, Gayle and Weisman demonstrate that raising prices for UNEs, for the set of UNE prices that preserve the efficient make-orbuy decision, discourages investment in process innovation. The foundation for this result is the well-known "Arrow Effect" (The incentive to invest in cost-reducing (process) innovation is increasing with the firm's output, ceteris paribus). In other words, it is the policy decision to mandate unbundling rather than low UNE prices per se that discourage the incumbent's investment in process innovation.
The authors note that it is important, therefore, that future policy debates take some care to distinguish between the investment effect of mandatory unbundling and the investment effect associated with changes in UNE prices. From a policy perspective, it is further noteworthy that the Federal Communications Commission has seemingly recognized the inherent problems associated with an exclusive focus on static efficiency and has begun to reverse course. This has taken the form of relaxing the set of network elements that incumbent providers are required to unbundle as well as reevaluating the TELRIC approach to determine the prices for those network elements that continue to be subject to mandatory unbundling.
The following theoretical paper by Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch and Niels Krap entitled "Broadband Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?" focuses on investment decisions pertaining to new generation networks. They model a firm's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretic setting. The decision as to whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. The price set by the firm can be expected to be lower than the non-regulated profit maximizing price because the firm wishes to reduce the probability of regulatory intervention. Thus, the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both the investment decision and the price via signals as to the regulation probability and price. These signals can be considered "optimal" if they simultaneously allow investment and reduce the firm's price. Accordingly, incorrect signals on the part of the regulator would reduce or prevent investments.
This paper develops rules regarding investment decisions under uncertainty associated with a regulation/non-regulation strategy that maximizes social welfare. With this approach, the authors provide a feasible solution to the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency faced by a regulator when a firm intends to invest in infrastructure facilities. Specifically, on the one hand, the regulator attempts to anticipate market-power exploitation, while on the other hand, it has to consider that the threat of intervention may prevent the investment. The paper shows that the greater the regulator's uncertainty about the lowest investment-permitting price increases, the more the regulatory authority should signal an increased tolerance against deviations from the regulated price. This would raise the intervention price and, consequently, the firm's profits. Nevertheless, the mere threat of a regulatory intervention constrains the price even without actual price regulation -a type of "regulatory contestability". Given the corresponding limitation of abuse of marketpower, ex-ante tolerance of super-normal profits can, from a welfare economic perspective, be considered to be preferable compared to preventing the investment. Moreover, the regulator's behavior could reduce information asymmetries and decrease the optimal level of tolerance, resulting in a more precise intervention price and an effective regulatory threat.
From a policy perspective a regulator should ex ante leave the infrastructure investment unregulated and signal the regulation price. This should encourage the firm to invest while preventing it from exploiting its monopoly power. From a dynamic perspective, such light-handed regulation could encourage additional welfare-enhancing infrastructure investment and ultimately render future regulation unnecessary.
The next paper in the issue is by Ying Fang and Robin Sickles entitled, "A Dynamic Model of Airline Competition" develops a dynamic game-theoretic analysis of market power in the airline industry. This paper proceeds to estimate the model using Kalmanfiltering techniques. In particular, the dynamic model focuses on collusion in airport-pair routes for selected U.S. airlines, namely United and American Airlines. Previous research in this area tended to rely on the conjectural variations approach, which views decisionmaking as myopic and hence ignores the future effects of current actions. This paper specifies and estimates a model whereby firms consider the future when they make decisions and those decisions, in turn, influence outcomes in the future.
Following passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the airline industry moved from service-based to price-based competition. Carriers were able to set their own fares, select and drop routes, and control flight frequency. Airlines continue to face substantial upheavals in the form of mergers, failures, bankruptcy filings, reorganizations, and operating losses. As industry concentration continues to increase and as the number of profitable incumbents continues to decrease, industry competitiveness becomes increasingly problematic. In this context, Fang and Sickles note that the dynamics of strategic decision-making involving, in part, formal alliances becomes an ever more prominent issue in terms of the competitive processes at work in the airline industry.
In this paper, the authors focus on the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency in a formal setting of repeated interaction between firms. For example, tacit collusion among firms is enforced by the threat of retaliation. But retaliation can occur only when it is learned that some member of the industry has deviated. In the context of the airline industry, before the existence of online travel companies, the prices charged by airlines may be somewhat hidden and difficult to discern. But in the current environment, the existence of companies such as Orbitz, which is an online travel company funded by five airlines, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest and United, enables an airline to observe changes in prices charged by its competitors on a virtual real-time basis.
Under asymmetric conditions, oligopolists' marginal costs may differ, thus they offer different prices. Low-cost firms would prefer to coordinate on a lower price than the higher-cost firms. In a static setting as an industry becomes more competitive, firms' price closer to marginal cost. However, at the same time in the airline industry there are sunk costs of gate and slot access, scale and network economies, and hub-and-spoke networks providing airport dominance, which can give carriers market power even on relatively competitive routes. For example, Fang and Sickles recognize that an airline's share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influence its ability to mark up price above cost. The authors provide evidence that there is significant market power in a dynamic setting of strategically interacting carriers at a level of disaggregation that provides the best empirical measures of such potential conduct, which is the city pair route.
The next paper by Hal Singer and Gregory Sidak, entitled "Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators" provides an analysis relevant for assessing mergers and discriminatory behavior in multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) markets. The authors note that three facts make vertical foreclosure strategies viable for U.S. cable operators. First, cable operators have vertically integrated into video programming. Second, cable operators control roughly 70 percent of all video customers in any given local market. Third, many forms of video programming, such as news and sports coverage, are local, making the carriage of such programming susceptible to foreclosure strategies, as the content provider depends critically on the local cable operator.
The authors argue that there is potential harm to unaffiliated content providers from foreclosure. By denying the unaffiliated regional sports networks (RSNs) access to more cable homes in a given geographic market, the operator ensures that the RSN cannot achieve certain economies, and quite possibly, cannot even achieve minimum viable scale. If the RSN cannot generate sufficient revenues to pay down the fixed costs of acquiring the rights to televise the games, the RSN will be forced to exit the market, resulting in complete foreclosure. At that stage, the cable operator can acquire the content outright.
However, even if the vertically integrated cable operator successfully induces the rival content provider to exit and thereby secures the local sports programming, it is not clear that the price that consumers pay for the programming is necessarily higher or that output is lower. After a vertically integrated content provider secures the regional sports programming, it can proceed to engage in conduit discrimination -that is, it can refuse to supply the requisite programming to a rival downstream MVPD. The most common rival MVPDs are direct broadcast satellite providers (DBS), although telephone companies such as AT&T and Verizon have recently entered the MVPD market. For content discrimination to lead to higher cable prices, it must be the case that rival MVPDs without access to the local sports programming cannot constrain cable prices to the same degree as MVPDs with access to local sports programming. Although there is little direct evidence in support of this proposition, some evidence suggests that lower DBS penetration leads to higher cable prices. Thus, to the extent that content discrimination results in lower penetration rates for rival MVPDs, content discrimination can lead to higher cable prices.
For Singer and Sidak the relevant question for regulators is how best to protect consumers against these forms of discrimination. With a requirement to provide rival MVPDs access to affiliated local programming, the vertically integrated operator could not limit its in-region DBS penetration rate through conduit discrimination. This requirement by itself may or may not deter the vertically integrated cable operator from refusing to deal with rival upstream programmers, as content discrimination may still be profitable in isolation. After the RSN is induced to exit, the regulator must then establish an "access price" at which the vertically integrated cable operator must make its affiliated local programming available to rival MVPDs. But only independent sports programmers can provide a true "arms length" price for programming. The difficulty in establishing an efficient "access price" suggests that the discrimination problem should be addressed at both the upstream and downstream levels.
Singer and Sidak use their analytical framework to assess the competitive effects of the recently consummated acquisition of Adelphia Communications Corporation by Comcast Corporation and Time Warner Cable Inc. on the local markets for sports programming. The FCC approved the merger subject to several conditions in July 2006. Singer and Sidak argue that the FCC's merger conditions are welfare-enhancing because by denying access to its platform, cable operators with sufficient downstream market power can impair an unaffiliated video programming provider's efficiency or even induce exit. The ultimate goal of such a strategy is to control the distribution of that content so that rival MVPDs cannot compete as effectively in the downstream market.
Singer and Sidak present regression results that explain the variations in DBS penetration rates across local markets. They conclude that Philadelphia's low DBS penetration rate (roughly 9.4 percent) is less than what one would expect given its demographic and economic characteristics. These results suggest that Comcast's refusal to supply rival MVPD rivals with its affiliated RSN is the likely cause of Philadelphia's low DBS penetration rate. Combined with evidence that lower DBS penetration results in higher cable prices supports the claim that foreclosure strategies not only harm upstream unaffiliated programmers, but may also harm consumers as well.
The remaining paper in this special issue, a survey by José García and James Reitzes entitled "International Perspectives on Electricity Market Monitoring and Market-Power Mitigation", relates to the market power concerns facing electricity regulators in the wake of the market restructuring process that has arisen in recent years. Regulators often encounter a difficult balancing act between protecting the interests of consumers and providing appropriate incentives for electricity generators. On the one hand, prices are expected be high enough to appropriately signal resource scarcity and thereby encourage investment in electricity generation during conditions when there is little excess capacity in the market. On the other hand, electricity markets arguably have a variety of characteristics that make them susceptible to exercises of market power, including concentrated generation ownership, limited excess generation capacity during peak demand periods, inelastic demand, transmission constraints that inhibit imports of electricity from neighboring regions, and a protracted, costly entry process.
Regulators need tools at their disposal to address abuses of market power and so-called acts of market manipulation by any individual market participant or group of market participants. As a result, many electricity markets have explicit market-monitoring and market-power mitigation procedures that are frequently administered by a separate regulatory apparatus entrusted with overseeing only electricity markets. Most of the literature examining market power in electricity markets analyze episodes where an abuse of market power has purportedly arisen, or assess whether newly deregulated markets are susceptible to substantial exercises of market power. The authors note that little attention has been paid to analyzing the different structural and design features of world electricity markets and assessing how these features interact with the approach used to monitor the market and mitigate market power. The Garcia and Reitzes paper seeks to fill this gap.
The authors argue that the framework for monitoring electricity markets and mitigating abuses of market power does respond to differences in market structure, design, and other characteristics. Important market structure features that affect the market-monitoring approach include: (i) the degree of market concentration; (ii) the particular fuel and technology mix in generating firms' portfolios; and, (iii) the nature of transmission constraints (affecting both import capability and internal system operation). Market-design features also have a profound influence on the approach to market monitoring. Key design features include: (i) whether it is a one-part (energy-only) or two-part (energy and capacity) market; (ii) whether trading is bilateral versus centralized; and (iii) which types of proprietary information are released to the public (and what is the timeliness of release). Since both structural and design features of electricity markets change over time, a periodic reassessment and adjustment of market power monitoring and mitigation policies might be needed.
Garcia and Reitzes reach a number of important conclusions. First, the use of aggressive market monitoring and behavioral mitigation measures in certain markets may be a symptom that the market's structure may not be conducive to robust competition. The evidence also suggests that highly concentrated markets tend to rely more heavily on exante behavioral mitigation (for example, price caps, bid restrictions, and restrictions against certain types of physical and economic withholding) measures rather than ex-post enforcement (for example, after-the-fact investigation and sanctions).
Second, ex-ante behavioral mitigation measures are common, especially in so-called "two-part" markets where generators earn revenue from selling both energy and capacity (such as the ISO -New England, New York ISO and PJM markets in the United States). "One-part" markets (such as those in Australia, New Zealand, Nord Pool, the United Kingdom, and Texas), where generators receive revenues from energy sales (and perhaps ancillary services), tend to rely more heavily on ex-post enforcement. Also, one-part markets arguably lean toward higher energy price caps in order to facilitate the ability of generators to recover their capital costs.
Third, markets that depend principally on bilateral trading, rather than centralized trading, rely more on ex-post enforcement capabilities (such as after-the-fact investigations) to deter market power. Arguably, this is due to the fact that in bilateral markets less information is typically collected from participants. The heavier reliance on long-term contracting in bilateral markets also has been identified as a factor that constrains market power. By contrast, markets with significant centralized trading tend to rely more on ex-ante behavioral restrictions to mitigate abusive behavior.
Lastly, certain one-part markets that depend principally on ex-post enforcement against abuses of market power (for example, United Kingdom, Nord Pool, Texas, New Zealand and Australia) impose strong information-disclosure requirements on their participants. The main objectives of these information-disclosure policies are apparently to alleviate information asymmetries, increase market liquidity, to encourage efficient price responses, and induce firms to invest and become more productive.
